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In the Supre:me C.ourt of the
State of Utah

E. R. SHAW and ESSIE 0. SHAW,
Plaint~ffs and Appellants,
CASE NO.

-vs.-

9206

BAILEY-McCUNE COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT ·O·F FACTS

For a number of years prior to 1947 the defendants in
the action below, W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey, husband and wife, were associated in business arrangements
with one H. W. McCune and Grace McCune, his wife. During the year 1957 they conducted two partnerships together, one called Baimac Company, which only Mr.
Bailey and Mr. McCune were partners (Tr. 5), and another partnership called Bailey-McCune company, in
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which both Mr. Bailey and 11r. l\icCune were partners,
together with their wives (Tr. 5).
On the 29th day of March, 19·47, the partnership of
Bailey-McCune Company was incorporated, the incorporators and their stock interest in the corporation were:
W. Lee Bailey, 100 shares; Gayle J. Bailey, 100 shares;
H. W. McCune, 100 shares; Grace J. McCune, 100 shares;
James P. McCune, 1 share ; and the Articles of Incorporation showed the stock to be $10 par and a paid in capital
of $4,010.00. The accompanying affidavit stated that
$4,010.00 had, in fact, been paid in cash. On the 1st day
of April, 1947, the company ratified the Articles of Incorporation and adopted the by-laws of Bailey-McCune
Company. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4.) Subsequent to
incorporation, on the 1st day of April, 1947, the corporation held its first directors' meeting, the one at which they
adopted the Articles and By-Laws, also elected officers,
to-wit: W. Lee Bailey, president; Grace J. McCune, vicepresident; H. W. McCune, Secretary; and Gayle J. Bailey,
treasurer. At that time the president presented a letter
to the directors from Baimac Company, a partnership,
consisting of W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey, H. W.
McCune and Grace J. McCune, offering to sell all of the
operating assets of the said partnership to the corporation. IThe portion of the corporate minutes that covers
this fact are found on Page 11 in the second portion of the
book under the designation Directors' ]\feeting, Nephi,
Utah, April1, 1947, which is set out as follows:
"The president presented a letter 'vhich the
directors received fron1 the Bain1ac Co1npany, a
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partnership consisting of W. Lee Bailey, Gayle
J. Bailey, H. W. McCune and Grace J. McCune,
offering to sell all operating assets of said partnership subject to the present liabilities as shown
by its books and records to the corporation in
exchange for all of the capital stock of the corporation, all of the subscriptions for the capital
stock of the corporation having been assigned to
the members of said partnership. The letter and
the accompanying balance sheet showed that the
operating assets of the partnership are carried
on the books as of JYfarch 31, 1947, at a net value
of $41,548.08. Said offer was considered by the
directors and they were unanimously of the opinion that the assets were fairly worth at least their
book value. Upon motion duly made, seconded
and unanimously carried, it was resolved that the
corporation issue all of its capital stock in the
par value of $40,000.00 to the partners of such
partnership as their interest may appear in accordance with the offer in exchange for all of the
operating assets of said partnership, subject to
the aforesaid liabilities, as listed on its balance
sheet dated March 31, 1947, in the net amount
of $41,548.08. Said operating assets and liabilities consist of the following:"
vVe will not set forth here the balance of that minute,
however, all of the assets were transferred to the corporation from the partnership except the Check-R-Feed Company accounts receivable in the amount of $30,173.52,
\\'"hich was left in the partnership. In other words, all of
the assets of the partnership, except one accounts receivable, were transferred and this one accounts receivable
was left in the partnership and apparently the partnership remained open. (See Exhibit 4, Page 13, Tr. 16.)
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It would appear that the partnership of Bailey-McCune
Company just changed its name to a corporation, however, what the assets of the Bailey-McCune Company, a
partnership, were and how they become part of the
Bailey-McCune Company, a corporation, is not disclosed
by the corporate minute nor is it disclosed whether the
corporation assumed the liabilities of Bailey-McCune
Company, a partnership, although it appears the BaileyMcCune Company, a corporation, took over the BaileyMcCune Company, a partnership. (Tr. 6, Line 8, 9, and
10.)
On May 10, 1947, the officers and directors of the corporation loaned to Bailey-l\fcCune Company the sum of
$10,000.00 and took back notes payable to themselves in
that amount dated May 9, 1947.
On August 31, 1948, W. Lee Bailey sold to BaileyMcCune Company stock in the Juab Valley Feed Company for $5,000.00 and took back from the Bailey-McCune
Company, a corporation, a promissory note in that
amount. On the same day the two principal stockholders,
McCune and Bailey, got together and divided the assets
of the Bailey-McC·une Company, a corporation, giving
to McCune 50 shares of the capital stock of the Juab
Valley Feed Company; a 1942 Studebaker; the pronlissory note of the corporation in the an1ount of $16,600.00 ~
a promissory 'note of the. corporation in the amount of
$1,650.00; and cash in the a1nount of $1,750.00, in return
for which the corporation got back 2,000 shares of its own
capital stock which it cancelled. This transaction increased the liability of the corporation by $18,250.00, re-
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duced its assets by $7,250.00, reduced its capital by
$20,000.00.
On the same day, the 31st of August, 1948, at a meeting held between the new stockholders and directors of
the corporation, H. W. McCune and Grace J. McCune
tendered their resignations and W. Lee Bailey and Gayle
J. Bailey were apparently elected to serve as the only
officers and directors of the corporation, W. Lee Bailey
being elected president and treasurer and Gayle J. Bailey,
vice-president and secretary; and were the only stockholders and directors as sho,vn by the minutes.
On the 23rd day of May, 1951, Bailey-McCune Company entered into a lease agreement with the plaintiffs to
lease their premises for a period of five years, which
lease agreement is shown as Exhibit 6. In addition, the
Bailey-McCune Company and/or W. Lee Bailey and
Gayle J. Bailey, purchased from the plaintiffs, E. R. Shaw
and Essie 0. Shaw, his wife, merchandise and equipment
for the sum of $6,601.66. (Note. The Court found that
only the corporation entered into the lease agreement and
made the purchase of these supplies and equipment.)
During the time that the Bailey-McCune ·Company,
a corporation, was in the building numerous payments
were made on the rental due with. checks of the Bailey
Investment Company and numerous transactions transpired between W. Lee Bailey, Gayle J. Bailey and the
Shaws. From this time on, 1\1ay 23, 1951, the affairs of
the Baileys and/or the Bailey-~IcCune Company, went
from bad to worse, rent became delinquent and eventually
on or about the 22nd day of April, 1957, the Shaws served
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Notice to Quit upon the Bailey-McCune Company and
upon W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey personally, and
near the end of May, approximately the 31st day of May,
1957, the defendants moved from the premises taking all
assets, merchandise, equipment, whereupon this action
was commenced.
The Springville Banking Company was included as a
party defendant for it claimed a mortgage interest in
property which is subject to a landlord's lien and upon
the litigation of the matter the Court preferred the landlord's lien of the plaintiffs to the mortgage and to other
creditors in the amount of $825.00 and gave judgment to
the plaintiffs against the Bailey-McCune Company, a
corporation, in the amount of $5,176.34, together with
an attorney's fee in the amount of $300.00. The facts contained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Amended Judgment have been stipulated as being accu:rnte as a matter of calculation, the only issue remaining
on appeal being the question of whether the defendants,
W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey, his wife, are personally liable.
STATEMENT ·OF POINTS
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THE DEFENDANTS, W. LEE BAILEY AND GAYLE J.
BAILEY, PERSONALLY LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS IN
T'HE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMEN'T RENDERED BY THE
TRIAL COURT AGAIN8T BAILEY-McCUNE COMPANY, A
CORPORATION.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THE DEFENDAN TS, W. LEE BAILEY AND GAYLE J.
BAILEY, PERSONALLY LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS IN
THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMEN'T RENDERED BY THE
TRIAL COURT AGAINST BAILEY-McCUNE COMPANY, A
CORPORATION.
1

It is obvious from the very beginning of this corporation that it was for sham purposes. The corporation was
founded for the sole purpose of continuing the partnership that previously existed. (Tr. 6) The recitations
contained in the Articles of Incorporation are apparently
false in so far as they pertain to the capital stock of the
corporation and the amount subscribed by each of the
parties and in respect to the oath of the incorporators at
the bottom of the Articles of Incorporation. For example,
they have set forth in their Articles of Incorporation that
there had been 401 shares of stock issued, totaling
$4,010.00, and that for these shares of stock they had
paid in cash to the company $4,010.00. (Plts. Exhibit
±, Page 4) This is obviously false and fraudulent, for Mr.
Bailey, on cross-examination, stated that he had put his
money in in the form of assets of the Baimac c·orporation.
(Tr. 17, L. 13 on) It was obvious from his testimony that
he was not speaking of an initial contribution of $1,000.00
on the part of each principal incorporator, for there was
never $4,010.00 paid in to the corporation even though the
verified Articles stated that amount had been paid in.
Furthermore, by looking at the stock book, it is clear that
there were no certificates issued as shown in the Articles
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of Incorporation and, in fact, the 401 shares set out in
the Articles were never issued. (Pits. Ex. 4, P. 4; Pits.
Ex. 5)
Mr. McCune, one of the initial incorporators,
never at any time owned any stock in the corporation as is
shown from the stock certificate book. If that is the
circumstance, then his position in the Articles is merely
nominal, formal, but not substantial. It is a familiar
maxim of law that "the law respects form less than
substance." The substance of this corporation is that the
partnership continued and the corporation form was a
mere shell; James P. McCune never receiving any stock
and the initial 401 shares not having been issued and the
$4,010.00 not having been paid in, and the oaths of the
incorporators being false and fraudulent.
In support of the above contentions, we cite to the
Court Utah qode Annotated 1943, 18-2-6 which sets forth
a minimum amount of capital stock required to be subscribed and paid in :
"To the articles of incorporation prepared in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding
section there shall be added the oath or affirmation of three or more of the incorporators, taken
before any officer duly authorized to administer
oaths, to the effect that they have commenced,
or it is bona fide their intention to commence and
carry on, the business mentioned in the articles of
incorportion, and that the affiants verily believe
that each party to the articles of incorporation
has paid or is able to and will pay the amount of
the capital stock subscribed for by him; and that
at le,ast ten per cent of the capital sto-ck subscribed
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by e,ach stockholder and not less than ten per cent

of the capital stock of the corporation has been
paid in. * * «c."

Utah Code Annotated 1943, 18-2-7, Payment of Subscriptions with Property:
HWhere subscriptions to the stock of any corporation, except corporations organized for mining or irrigation purposes, shall consist in whole
or in part of property necessary to the pursuits
agreed upon, the articles of incorporation shall be
further supplemented by the affidavits of three
persons to the effect that they are acquainted with
such property and that it is reasonably worth the
amount in cash for which it was accepted by the
corporation."
In respect to a director's liability for knowing the
law, knowing what he is signing an oath to his liability
for damages resulting from the untruthfulness of such
corporate representations, are set forth in Ashley v.
Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258 N.W. 639, 99 ALR 844. In that
case it is stated:
"Directors should know of, and give direction
to, the general affairs of the institution and to
its business policy, and have a general knowledge
of the manner in which the business is conducted.
No custom or practice can make a directorship
a mere position of honor, void of responsibility.
* * * Where the duty of knowing exists, ignorance due to negligence of duty on the part of a
director creates the same liability as actual knowledge and a failure to act thereon. * * *."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The above case involves the question of whether the
directors knew what language was contained in bonds
issued by the corporation. The response of the directors
was similar to the response of Mr. Bailey in Court, that
he had complete confidence in his attorney and did know
that he was doing wrong. In this case the Court imposed
personal liability on the director.
A second fact which is of considerable importance
in this case is that of the date of incorporation. The
accountants for Bailey-McCune Company, a partnership,
prepared a financial statement wherein they set forth
the assets of the corporation and a beginning balance
sheet of the corporation. (Def. Ex. 17) The beginning
balance of the corporation, you will note, had $2,060.56
in as cash and showed no amount as having been paid in
by the stock subscribers, but indicated the capital structure of the company to be as shown by the Board of Directors' meeting April 1, 1947. In other words, all~ of the
stock of Bailey-McCune Company, a corporation, was issued for $41,548.08, a calculated net worth of BaileyMcCune Company, a partnership. It is apparent that at
the time of founding this corporation the partnership had
in mind transferring all of these assets for stock, and
if that were the circumstance, then where is the affidavit
required by the law of the State of Utah setting forth
the true value of the goods and merchandise transferred
for stock. This affidavit is not to be found~ 'vhich is another evidence of fraud. By making false statements as
to paid in capital they could fraudulently avoid the legal
· requirement of an affidavit of value. (U.c·.A. 1943, 18-2-7)
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Furthern1ore, we point out to the Court that th'3
capitalization of the company cannot be more than
$40,000.00, as shown by the Articles of Incorporation.
Against this was transferred to the company the liabilities of $85,478.33. It is also interesting to note that the
partners deleted from the assets of Bailey-McCune Con1pany, a partnership, an accounts receivable of $30,173.52,
which they kept personally. From the minutes of April
1, 1947, and the financial staten1ent introduced by the defendants, (Def. Ex. 17), it is clear that assets of questionable value were transferred to the company and that liabilities of fixed value were received by the company and
the fixed value of the liabilities exceeded by 100% the
capitalization of the corporation. 'This cannot be said to
have been an honest incorporation, especially in view of
the fact that the primary and apparently most valuable
asset was deleted from the assets of the corporation and
kept personally by the partners, and we have no proof
as to the actual value of assets as required by la,v.
(U.C.A. 1943, 18-2-7) The Court is well aware that financial statements can be prepared which are totally untrue
and do not reflect the actual value of the corporation.
The history of this company indicates that it was
under-capitalized and over-indebted. This is especially
so when we see that the assets were supposedly in the
$127,000.00 category and yet the cash balances are approximately $2,000, indicating less than two per cent
liquidity, which is a risky financial beginning for a corporation with an-indebtedness of $85,000.00 plus. Furthermore, the fact that the partners had to lend the corpora-
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tion $5,000.00 within a month after incorporation verifies
this contention and refutes their oath that they had paid
in $4,010.00 in cash. (Plts. Ex. 4, P. 6) ·
Let us take the legal consequences of capitalizing d.
company for an amount less than half the indebtedness
of the company. This should be considered to be a fraud
upon the creditors as being an insufficiently capitalized
company. The situation is a fortiori on August 1, 1948,
the date of the withdrawal of 1\IcCune. By that time analysis of the minutes of the company shows that the company has assumed other liabilities, to-wit:
(1) $5,000.00 borrowed from Mr. Bailey and Mr.
McCune on May 10, 1947, (a fact which makes it obvious
that the company did not have sufficient operating capital
at the time of its incorporation (March 27, 1947), and
show that these people did not want to take stock for their
interest, but would rather loan the money to the corporation and become creditors of it) ;
(2) A lease on September 10, 1947, from Baimac
Company, which is also made up of the partners who were
the only stockholders of the company, 'vhich is an obligation of the company;
(3) -'The purchase of property in Spanish Fork for
the sum of $15,961.00 to be paid in monthly payments of
$200.00. (There is no indication that anything was paid
down on the said property.);
( 4) The purchase of 50 shares of stock in Juab
Feed Company from Lee Bailey for the sum of $5,000.00
and the making to him a note to· that extent; and
(5) Giving to Mr. l\fcCune assets and notes valued
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in the a1nount of $25,500.00 on the 31st day of August,
1948; thereby increasing the company's liabilities, by the
minutes, within one year by $41,500.00 from the $8'5,±78.33, making the total liabilities of the company at approximately $128,000.00, less whatever they paid on them
within that year. These transactions also reduced the
assets by $7,250.00 and reduced the capital stock by $20,000.00. In other words, by August 31, 1948, by the corporation minutes, it appears that the company's liabilities
were approxhnately $128,000.00, less whatever they had
paid on them during that year, against a $20,000.00 capitalization and a $7 ,2.50.00 reduction in assets.
This is not considered an honest, fair dealing type of
transaction which the Court will tolerate. In the first
place, it is obvious from the transfer of the Juab Feed
stock that Mr. Bailey did not want to become a stockholder in the company, but merely a creditor, and the
same goes for Mr. McCune. (Tr. 21; Pits. Exh. 4, P. 21)
Mr. H. W. McCune takes back a note from the corporation
with the Juab Feed Company stock and Mr. Bailey takes
a note from the corporation for the stock, rather than
trading to Mr. McCune directly stock for stock, thereby
maintaining the capital in somewhat the same condition
in respect to this $5,000.00. This is an indication of their
bad faith. It cannot be said that bad faith isn't a present
material fact in all of these transactions. A case in point
is Auomotr£z Del Golfo De Cal. v. Resnick, which is found
in -!7 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1, 63 ALR 1042. The ·Court
said this:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
"Another factor to be considered in determining whether individuals dealing through a corporation should be held p-ersonally responsible for the
corporate obligations is whether there was an attempt to provide adequate capitalization for the
corporation. In Ballantine on Corporations (rev
ed, 1946), at pages 302.-303, it is stated: 'If a corporation is organized and carries on business without substantial capital in such a way that the corporation is likely to have no sufficient assets available to meet its debts, it is ~nequitable that shareholders should set up such a fltmsy organizatvon
to escape personal li.ability. The attempt to do
corporate business without providing any sufficient basis of financial responsibility to creditors
is an abuse of the separate entity and will be ineffectual to exempt the shareholders from corporate debts. It is coming to be recognized as the
policy of the law that shareholders should in good
faith put at the risk of the business unencumbered
capital reasonably adequate for its prospective
liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling
compared with the business to be done and the
risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the
separate entity privilege.' ''
In the case above cited the Court imposed personal
liability.
Furthermore, let us take a look at the lT tah Statutes.
The law in Utah in 1948 'vas Utah Code Annotated 1943,
18-2-17:
"No corporation shall make or pay any dividend except fro1n the surplus profits arising fron1
the business of the corporation and in the cases
and manner allo"\ved by la"T; nor divide, wi·thdraw, or in any ntanner ea:cept as prov1~ded by
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to the stockholders or any of thern, any
part of the capital of the corporation."

la'U1 pay

Consider how Mr. and Mrs. H. W. McCune withdrew
from the corporation :

Q.

(By Mr. Howard) You have told us today
how the transaction came about in respect to
buying ~1r. McCune's interest in the company,
have you not'
A. I think so.
Q. Let me ask you if you didn't say it came about
this way: On July 12th, 1958, and I am referring to page 6, line 11 of your deposition-line

9:

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q. You purchased their interest'
A. Well, it was retired.
Q. Was it purchased by you or by the company' In other words, did you buy the
stock or did the company itself buy the
stock of these people'
A. Well, I had better answer that in this
\vay. We had holdings consisting of agriculture, dairy farm, turkey farm, and
when the meeting took place, we divided
up, he took this and that and that and so
on in the transaction. After he had taken
the assets, the personal assets of various
things I owed him $1650.00 cash which
was paid to him, and as a result of that
why all of the stock in Bailey-McCune
Company, as of that date, was acquired
by Gayle J. Bailey and myself.
Wasn't that your testimony'
The Joseph N. Costello CompanyWasn't that your answer'
I guess that was my testimony. (Tr. 67, L 8
through 29)
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What this plainly amounts to is a division of par~tner
ship assets by partners.
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 18-2-18:
"No corporation shall receive or discount any
note or other evidence of debt with the intent to
enable any stockholder to withdraw any part of
the money paid in by him on his stock, except as
provided by law."
Another fact which should be considered is the relationship between the corporation and the partnership,
which it succeeded. In this case the corporation merely
continued the same name as the partnership, had the
same partners, with the exception of James P. McCune,
who is represented under oath to be a stockholder but to
whom no stock was ever issued.

Sweet v. Watson's Nursery, 92 P.2d 814:
"A corporation with only two stockholders,
the stockholders and directors of which held no
meetings for four years and all personal business
of stockholders was transacted through bank account of corporation, was the alter ego of stockholders who were individually liable for damages
for breach of warranty in sale of property of corporation."
"When a corporation is organized or perpetuated for particular purposes of carrying out plans
of partners or associates in business, the courts
will look through the corporation to the individuals
and the rule applies irrespective of whether corporation be deemed a 'one-man' corporation or a
'two-1nan' corporation."
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rrhis case is in point in that it was a corporation
fortned to carry out the business of a partnership and
continued its business in the same manner as it had prior
to its incorporation. No substantial change in business
procedure, in spite of the statutory requirements to the
contrary.
"The rule is clear that where a corporation
is merely the business conduit of an individual or
partners, the courts will look through the corporation to the individual. Wenban Estates, Inc. v.
Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 695, 227 P. 723; Continental
Securities etc. Co. v. Rawson, 208 Cal. 228, 2'38,
280 P. 954. When a corporation is organized or
perpetuated for the particular purpose of carrying out the plans of partners or associates in business, the same rule has been held to apply, and
whether the corporation be deemed a 'one-man'
corporation, or as here claimed, a 'two-man' corporation, the rule is the same. D.N. & E. Walter
& Co. v. Zuckerman, 214 Cal. 418, at page 420, 6
P.2d 251, 79 ALR 329; Wise Realty Co. v. Stewart,
169 Cal. 176, 146 P. 534."
It is shown from the minutes of the company that
after its institution and initiation it never held any stockholders meetings, ( Tr. 69, L 27, 28, 29), never re-elected
officers, never kept a stockholders minute book, and such
minutes as have been kept are of such infrequent intervals
as to indicate only occasional adherence to corporate formality.
Speaking of corporate formalities-that have not
been complied with-we are necessarily confronted with
the next fact situation which is inconsistent with corpo-
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rate existence and compatable with personal liability. For
example, Article VII of the Articles of Incorporation of
Bailey-McCune Company is as follows:
"ARTICLE VII
The officers of this corporation shall be as
follows: (a) Boar·d of Directors consisting of four
persons, three of whom shall constitute a quorum;
(b) a president; (c) a vice-President; (d) a secretary ; and (e) a treasurer. All of such officers
must be stockholders of the corporation, and the
president and vice-president must be directors.
The directors shall be elected by a majority vote
of the capital stock represented at the annual
meeting of the stockholders, and the directors shall
from their members, appoint the president and
vice-president at their first meeting after the regular annual meeting of the stockholders. The directors shall also appoint the secretary and treasurer, and the same person may hold both offvces.
All of such officers shall hold office for a term of
one year and until their successor is elected and
qualified. The Board of Directors shall fill any
vacancies occurring in the offices of the corporation for any cause, and any of said officers may
be removed for cause by a two-thirds vote of the
capital stock represented at any annual or special
meeting of the stockholders.'' (Emphasis added.)
(Pits. Ex. 4, P. 4)
You will note that the officers of this corporation
shall be four persons. That does not say tw·o persons
holding four offices, but intends four persons and it
specifically says that the secretary-treasurer n1ay be the
same person, which by rules of legal interpretation, in-
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clusio unius est excl u~io alterus, necessarily means that
they are the only two offices that can be held by the same
person. Compare this with Article III of the By-Laws:
''ARTICLE III
A board of four directors shall be chosen
annually by the stockholders at their annual
meeting in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, and shall hold office for one year
and until their respective successors are elected
and qualify.
'-1.

2. Regular meetings of the Board of Directors shall be held at such time and place as
the directors may by resolution determine, and
no notice of such regular meetings shall be required. Special meetings may be called by the
president or any two directors by giving five
days notice to each director, or special meetings
may be held at any time by unanimous consent
of the directors. Three d~rectors shall consti't'ute
a quorum for the transaction of business." (Emphasis Added.)
It is obvious from Article 'TII of the Articles of
Incorporation and Article III of the By-Laws that all
of the meetings of directors since August 31, 1948, have
been invalid for failure to have a quorun1, and for failure
to have a board of directors as required by Utah Code
Annotated 1943, 18-2-20. In other words, until there
are four people elected as directors there was no Board
and there could be no quorum without three directors
present. Both Mr. and Mrs. Bailey admitted that there
had been no amendment to the Articles of Incorporation
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and no amend1nent to the By-Laws (Tr. 28, 70) and,
consequently, these are the only rules for the government
of the corporation.
It further shows with great clarity that Mr. and
Mrs. Bailey were not interested in conducting their affairs
according to the rules set forth in the By-Laws but
conducted the corporate affairs as if it were their own
personal business and as they saw fit in respect to
directors' and stockholders' meetings. For example, consider the co-mingling of funds between Bailey-McCune
Company, the corporation, and Bailey Investment
Company ('Tt. 58) and the Baileys themselves. In respect to the needs of the Baileys, they drew money
against a salary account as they needed it:

Q. You would take these checks out as you
needed them~
A. As I needed the money to live on.
Q. But you didn't receive a regular salary?
A. The salary checks were written on a regular
basis.
Q. But those checks were not - would not be
cashed~

A. That is right.
Q. So you received the actual money as you
needed it; isn't that correct~
A. As I chose to draw on 1ny salary account.
Q. ;yes.
A. Yes, as I chose to draw against the salary
check that had been "Tritten." ( Tr. 34, Ll-13)
It is further emphasized by the fact that ~Ir. Bailey
and Mrs. Bailey did not even know at the time of the
trial when stockholders meetings were and if the c·ourt
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will refer to the deposition of Mr. Bailey, he stated

iu the deposition he thought it was in September, (Dep.
13, L 23-26) which he later corrected, and at the time
of trial he said he thought it was in April, (Tr. 29)
when, in fact, the Articles of Incorporation stated it
was in ~lay. See Article V, Sub-section 1 of the ByLa\vs, (Plts. Ex. 4, P. 9) which states that the annual
stockholders meeting shall be 2:00 P.M. on the first
Saturday after the first Monday in 1\fay of each year.
Furthermore, by comparing the transactions indicated
in the minute book and also by reference to the testimony
of Mr. and Mrs. Bailey, it is obvious that the corporation
never complied in any respect with the requirements of
Article V of the By-Laws, which was another meaningless article to Mr. and Mrs. Bailey
Two Utah cases which are in point and support the
contentions of the appellants are Western Securvtves Co.
v. Spiro, 62 U. 623, 221 P. 856, and Geary v. G~ain, et
al. 79 U. 269, 9 P.2d 396.
The Western Securities case involved a one-man
corporation with nominal incorporators. There were
various transactions between the parties, some with the
plaintiff corporation and some with its principal stockholder, H. P. Clark. Without going into a lengthy comparison of the facts, suffice it to say that they were
analogous. The Court therein said:
"'That, under certain circumstances, the legal
entity of the corporation must be entirely disregarded is clearly pointed out by the court in the
case first above cited. (Louisville Banking Co. v.
Eicenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S.vV. 591). The courts
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have had frequent occasion to consider facts and
circumstances similar or analogous to those in
the case at bar, and to apply the law to such
facts and circumstances. It would be a mere
travesty of justice if courts could or should refuse
to look behind the mere form of a transaction
in order to ascertain the real truth and reach
and hold responsible the real parties in interst."
The Geary case was a suit against Gain who had
but one share of stock in the corporation, however,
if Gain had been in a circumstance similar to Bailey
in the principal case then the Court's language would
have bound him. The court said :
"It would be applicable (the alter ego theory)
• • • if Gain, in fact, owned the stock. • • • The
doctrine simply means that the courts, ignoring
forms and looking to the substance of things,
will regard the stockholders of a corporation as
the owners of its property, or as the real parties
in interest, whenever it is necessary to do so to
prevent a fraud which might otherwise go without
redress, or to do justice which might otherwise
fail."
The language .of the Utah Court "Tould seem clearly
applicable in the case where the Bailey-McCune Company has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors
and has not included the plaintiffs. (Tr. 66-67)
There are many other cases that 'viii support the
position of the plaintiffs in this respect, a few of which
are cited as follows:
First is the case that is very similar in point called
Stark v. Coker as found in 129 P.2d 390. This is a
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California case involving defendants John B. Coker
and Regina W. Coker, his wife. It is a suit by one of
the creditors to recover an indebtedness that arose on
a deed of trust. The defense was one of corporate
iln1nunity. The Court, in discussing the proble1ns, said
as follows:
"The two requirements are that there be such
unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual
no longer exist and that adherence to the fiction
of separate existence would, under the circumstances, promote fraud, or injustice. On the second score it is sufficient that iJt appear that
recognition of the acts as those of a corporation
only will produce t~tequitable results. "\Ve believe
there was sufficient evidence before the lower
court to justify it in determining that those requirements were met. There were several pertinent circumstances. Assuming that at the time· of
the original indebtedness incurred between 1924
and 1928, the evidence indicates that there was
no ground for piercing the corporate veil, it
appears that from 1931 to 1934, the date of the
note in question, and thereafter, there were no
officers elected, no board of directors, or stockholders' meetings held and no minute entries.
At all of those times defendant John B. Coker
was president of the corporation, owning 139
of the 150 outstanding shares of stock. His wife,
defendant Regina Coker, was secretary of the
corporation and owned 1 share of stock. The other
11 shares were held in escrow in a bank, the
whereabouts of the owner thereof being unknoWn
and he did not participate in the corporation's
business. The affairs of the corporation were
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conducted by John B. Coker. The stock had no
market value. • * . ,
It is interesting to note that the basis for setting
these things aside is not unlawful misrepresentation
or fraud, but on the basis that to hold otherwise would
produce inequitable results, or that injustice would occur
if corporate emunity were allowed to be used as a
shield. This concept is rather clearly set forth in the
landmark case in this alter ego theory which is designated as Wvttmann v. Wh~ttingham, 259 P. 63. This was
a case of a one-man corporation. He had, however,
complied with the formal law and his By-Laws by having
nominal directors, ··all 'of whom owned one share of
stock, but the real power and control of the company
was exercised by the defendant Whittingham. It was
a suit upon a note owed by the corporation. There was
no particular evidence of fraud. The rational of the
case was that this was not a genuine corporation, because of the attitude of the principal stockholder toward
it. The Court in this case said as follows:
"We are of the opinion that there is ample
evidence from which to conclude that appellant
was the alter ego of the corporation, and comes
within the rule laid down in MinifiJe v. Rowley,
187 Cal. 481, 202 P. 673: 'Before the acts and
obligations of a corporation can be legally recognized as those of a particular person, and viceversa, the follo,ving co1nbination of circumstances
must be made to appear: First, that the corporation is not only influenced and governed by that
person, but that there is such a unitv of interest
and ownership that the individuality, or separ-
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ateness, of the said person and corporation has
ceased ; second, that the facts are such that an
adherence to the fiction of the separate existence
of the corporation would, under the particular
circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote injustice."
It can be easily seen from the rules set down in
the above case and in the Jl!linifie v. Rowley case that
there is a unity of interest and ownership here of such
a nature that the individuality and separateness of W.
Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey cannot be distinguished
from that of Bailey-McCune Company. This is even
more certainly established when you see that they do
business under Bailey Investment Company, write checks
under Bailey Investment ·Company to pay the debts of
Bailey-McCune Company (Tr. 60) and deposited Bailey
l\fcCune money to the account of Bailey Investment
Company (Tr. 60). Bailey Investment Company is another personality separate and apart from BaileyMcCune Company, but an artificial personality or creation which has no personality separate and apart from
that of W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey, but which
"\vas the recipient of corporate funds. This is also shown
by the fact that they did business under the name of
Rite - Way Stores as well as Bailey- McCune Conlpany, which fully exemplifies the personality situation set
forth in the above citation. How could a person dealing
,,~ith these people assume that they were dealing with anyone other than W. Lee Bailey and Gayle J. Bailey because
Bailey-l\IcCune Company did not have any personality
separate and apart from these people any more than
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did Bailey Investment Company or Rite-Way Stores.
This is even more clearly shown by the evidence produced at trial. The Court will remember how this lease
was negotiated and how the payments were received
and the continual contracts between W. Lee Bailey and
Ron Shaw and the many personal references made with
the personal pronoun "I" when speaking of the company.
We have mentioned in the above citation that fraud
is not an essential element in a case of this nature.
We have shown that nonconformity· with statutory requirements and total disregard for corporate formalities
is an indication of bad faith. It is further proof that
these people did not regard themselves as a corporation
except for the purpose of obtaining personal immunity.
The court has considered these problems before and a
case that is in point in this respect is Taylor v. Newton,
which is found in 257 P.2d, Page 68, wherein it is stated:
"True, there is no showing or claim of fraud
in the instant case on the· part of Caroline S.
Wenban or the corporation plaintiff. Still, as
previously indicated, vt is not necessary that actual fr,aud be shown. It is sufficient if a refusal
to recognize the fact of the identity of the corporate existence U''l;th that of the lndivvdual would
br1Jng ,about inequi,table results. All of the facts
and circu1nstances surrounding the inception of
and attending the controversy in suit bring the
case clearly within the t"\YO requiren1ents declared
in M ~"nvfve v. Rowley, supra, to be sufficient to
constitute the cause of action stated in the crosscomplaints of the several appellants."
"In the case of Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co.,
33 Cal. 2d 514, at page 5:22, 203 P .2d 533, at
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page 327, the court said: 'The cases· mentioned
illustrate in a factual context similar to that
before us the rule that where the recognition of
the fiction of separate corporate existence would
foster an injustice or further a fraud the courts
"Till refuse to recognize it. Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.
2d 839, S-tfi, 129 P.2d 390; Pucett~ v. Girola, 20
Cal. 2d 57-1:, 578, 128 P.2d 13; Shea v. Leonis, 14
Cal. 2d. 666, 669, 96 P.2d 332. It is not necessary
that the plaintiff prove actual fraud. It is enough
if the recognition of the two entities as separate
would result in an injustice. W enban. Estate, Inc.
v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 698, 227 P. 723; M~nifie
v. Rowley, 187 ·Cal. 481, 488, 202 P. 673. Here
confusion would be promoted and an unjust result be accomplished if the maintenance of two
entities controlled by the same persons and having
an identical name were permitted to frustrate
a meritorious claim.' "
The above case is cited not only for its compilation
of authority and summary of the law concerning the
relationship required, but the case also states that the
significant elements of an alter ego situation are ( 1)
control, and (2) a stated fact upon which an adherence
to separate entity would be unjust. This is the very
language of the court as stated on Page 72 of that
citation. The plaintiffs cannot think of a situation that
more clearly fits that test than the principal case.
I do not believe that the defendants would contend
that they do not have suficient unity of interest to fall
'Yithin this alter ego rule. As far as the second element
is concerned, insolvency furnishes a clear occasion for
the employment of the doctrine. This factor played an
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important part in a case involving this principal where
corporations were involved.
WiJethoff v. Refining Properties, as found in 47
P.2d at Page 315, concerns the signing of a lease of
service station property and held the assignee liable
for the rent thereof even though they were assignees
under a corporate form. The important part of the decision, as pertaining to this case, is as stated on Page
317 of that decision :

"While it is the general rule that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its
stockholders, with separate, distinct liabilities and
obligations, nevertheless there is a well-recognized and firmly settled exception to this general
rule, that, when necessary to redress fraud, protect the rights of third persons or prevent a palpable injustice, the law and equity will intervene
and cast aside the legal fiction of independent
corporate existence, as distinguished from those
who hold and own the corporate capital stock,
and deal with the corporation and stockholders
as identical entities, ''"'ith identical duties and
obligations. W enban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193
Cal. 675, at page 696, 227 P. 733, 731. The fiction
of corporate entity n1ay be disregarded, where
one corporation is so organized and controlled
and its affairs are so conducted that it is, in
fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of another
corporation. In.dustrval Research Corp. v. General
Motors Corp. (D.C.) 29 F. (~) 623, 625. See also
Llewellyn Iron Works v. Abbott Kz~nney Co., 172
Cal. 210, and cases collated at page 214, 155 P.
986, 987."
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Other decisions have reaffirmed the fact that insolvency plus unity of interest and ownership satisfy the
require1nents of the rule. One of these cases is Sunset
Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 2d 389, 50
P.2d 106, whcih case has been cited above. Taylor v .
.~.Vewton also cited above is in point in this respect.
The rule concerning alter egos has been applied
between corporations and partnerships and between
corporations and partnerships and between corporations
and individuals doing business as corporations, and
various other analogous situations. The plaintiffs cite
a few cases in addition to those cited above to show
the rule as has been set forth in these cases:
(A). JYiclver v. Norman, 187 or 516, 213 P.2d 144,
13 ALR 7-±9. This is a lawsuit between joint venturers,
one joint venturer doing business as a corporation.
The plaintiff, who was the other party on the joint venture project, brings an action against the corporation,
which was doing business as the other party to the
joint venture. It is in point in that all the stock of
the corporation was owned by ~lei ver and his wife :
"vVhile, for all ordinary purposes, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity separate and
distinct from its stockholders, yet, as Judge Sanborn said in [1nited States v. Milwa~tkee Refr~ger
ator Transit Co., CC, 142 F. 247, 255, 'when the
notice of legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation
as an association of persons.' See Secur~'V;y Savings & Tr1tst Co. v. Portland Flour Mills Co., 124
Or. 276, 288, 261 P. 43:2. In view of the fiduciary
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relation between the parties, it would be an obvious fraud upon Norman, if, as he asserts,
erroneous or fabricated charges were made
against the joint adventure by Equitable, to permit Mciver to escape responsibility for such delicts by shielding himself behind the corporate
form. On the other hand, since Norman insists
upon this view of the matter where it is to his
interest to do so, it would be grossly inequitable,
in considering Norman's contention, that Mciver
had failed in his obligations to the joint adventure
and that he was justified for that, among other
reasons, in excluding Mciver from participation
in its profits, to say that credit for the corporation's contribution to the enterprise is to be withheld from Mciver. We shall, therefore, in our
discussion of the case, treat Melver and Equitable
as one and the same person.''
It is interesting to note from the above citation
that there was no fraud shown or alleged, but merely
that the Court felt that it was inequitable under the
circumstances to allow the defendant to obtain corporate
emunity when his relationship to the corporation was
solely for that purpose and that the corporation existed
for no other reason, and especially since the personalities of the corporation and 1\{clver 'Yere one and the same.
(B). Another case which the Court 1nay find of
interest is the case of H.A.S. Loan Service v. McColgan,
21 Cal. 2d 518, 133 P.2d 391. This 'Yas a case where
there were two corporations 'vhose stockholders 'vere
primarily the same people. 'Their respective businesses
were complimentary one to another and one corporation
could do through the other "That it could not do for
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it~elf.

There was no showing, however, that anything it
did through the other corporation was illegal per se,
but merely that the corporate status of the second corporation was strictly one of convenience. The Court in
this case said as follo,vs:
HIt is well settled that evidence of this character is sufficient to support a judgment. Particularly in cases involving the disregard of a
corporate entity, the evidence although circumstantial is sufficient; each case must rest upon
its special facts, and such determination is
peculiarly within the province of the trier of
fact. See Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P.2d
390. The manner in which the business was conducted, particularly the guarantee of the payment
of the loans by plaintiff and other circumstances
above outlined furnished convincing evidence to
support the findings. The testimony of the officers
of the plaintiff and Marshall Finance Company
was that of interested witnesses. Under the circumstances here presented the two corporate entities were in fact one, or if they be considered
separate, two, in effect, engaged in a single
business. The corporate entity may be disregarded
when it is used to evade the law. 21 c·al. 2d Adv.
p. 551, 133 p .2d 391."
The following citation is analogous and we cite it
merely to show the simplicity by which courts can pierce
the corporate veil in order to get to the parties in interest:
"There has been a growing tendency upon
the part of the courts to disregard corporate
entity and to treat the stockholders thereof as
an association of individuals when the interests
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of justice are to be served." M etropolitam H oldimg
Co. v. Snyder, 79 F.(2d) 263, 103 ALR 912.
Another case which is in point in this situation
Is the case where a creditor formerly supplied Home
Builders' Supply Company, which was a sole proprietorship. The company later was incorporated and it supplied
the incorporated company. Prior to supplying the sole
proprietorship it obtained a guarantee from a person
who guaranteed the obligations of the sole proprietorship. The court held that the guarantee was effective
to the corporation and to its principal stockholder in
as much as there had been no material change in debtors
and to hold otherwise would be inequitable. The case
is fairly unique in as much at it is a suit between a
creditor and the guarantor of the sole proprietorship
and does not involve the corporation except to show
that it never did exist, for reason of its alter ego relationship to the principal stockholder. The case does
not involve the principal stockholder or the corporation.
It is cited as follows:
D.N. & E. Walter Co. v. Zuckerman, 6 P.2d
251, 79 ALR 330.
"We think the trial court "~as in error in
its conclusion on the undisputed facts. The corporation was distinctly a one-n1an corporation. It
was Goldberg's alter ego, co1npletely owned, dominated, and controlled by him. This 'vas also true
as to the business for1nerly conducted by him
under the san1e name. To all intents and purposes
Goldberg at all ti1nes involved herein eontinued
to transact business under the nan1e of IIo1ne
B
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I3uilder~' Supply Co." The separateness of the
person and the corporation would of course be
recognized if no inequitable results would follow.
But where, as here, an inequitable result would
follow, the two should be considered as one, and
the doctrine of Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481,
202 P. 673, and Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett,
193 Cal. 675, 227 P. 723, would apply."

CONCLUSION

A citation which summarizes the position that we
have atternpted to state above and is appropriate for
a concluding reference is that found in 13 Am. Jur.
160, Sec. 7:
"The doctrine that a corporation is a legal
entity existing separate and apart from the persons composing it is a legal theory introduced
for purposes of convenience and to subserve the
ends of justice. The concept cannot, therefore,
be extended to a point beyond its reason and
policy, and when invoked in support of an end
subversive of this policy, will be disregarded by
the courts. Thus, in an appropriate case and in
furtherance of the ends of justice, a corporation
and the individual or individuals owning all its
stock and assets will be treated as identical, the
corporate entity being disregarded where used as
a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality."
In sumn1ary it can be said that the doctrine has
been applied in many cases and under different theories,
but the result has always been the same. The principal
requirements appear to be that there be a unity of
interest and o'vnership and that the individuality or
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separateness of the person and of the corporation has
ceased, and the facts are such that an adherence to the
fiction of separate existence of the corporation would,
under the particular circumstance of the case, promote
an injustice. To hold otherwise here would allow the
defendants in this case to have benefited personally from
all the transactions, to have paid themselves salaries, to
conduct the business for many years, to have sold the
plaintiffs' merchandise, not accounted for the receipts,
and to have all of the benefits of personal ownership
without personal liability. The injustice of it here is
that they did not ever act as a corporation. They did
not assume any of the burdens of corporate existence
as required by their Articles and By-Laws, it being a
sham from the very conception. Other fact situations
that support our position that Bailey-McCune Company
is nothing more than the alter ego of W. Lee Bailey
and Gayle J. Bailey, his wife, is the co-mingling of
personal and corporate funds, as evidenced by the manner in which Mr. and Mrs. McCune dre\v their salaries;
the inadequate capitalization of the company considering
the debts and liabilities that the company had assumed;
failure of the officers to conform to standard corporate
procedures, as above set forth. These are all substantial
and sufficient reasons for imposing the alter ego doctrine. !The elements of the unity of interest and o\vnership
has been clearly established in as much as ~fr. and ~frs.
Bailey are the sole and only owners of the stock of
Bailey-McCune Con1pany, constitute all of the officers
and directors, and the corporate records and corporate
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tninute book shows that 1ninutes have not been filed
since N ovetnber 8, 1952, even though there are supplemental documents furnished at the time of trial designated as minutes but being unsigned and lacking the
legal for1nalities of minutes. It is also interesting to
note that in respect to the minutes that time intervals
in excess of one year have occurred on several occasions
between directors' meetings. This fact, combined with
the manner in which they did business, and personal
references to themselves when referring to the corporation, is sufficient to show unity of interest and ownership.
We have also shown that insolvency is a clear occasion for employment of a doctrine of alter ego, for
it indicates a situation that is inequitable or unjust to
the creditors and these are sufficient facts to invoke
the application of the doctrine. We have also shown by
our citations above that it is a familiar circumstance
for individuals to use corporate form to conduct a partnership or joint venture and that in such cases the
courts have by-passed the corporate entities and have
treated the parties relationship as a partnership in
determining their rights and liabilites.
Respectfully submitted,
B. HowARD, for
HOWARD AND LEWIS and
UDELL JENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

JACKSON
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